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EDWARD D. WORRELL. 91

erring reason of a juror, as he is passing from the known to
the unknown. And when you attempt to place yourself in
the position of my supposed spectator of the scene, and from
your seats here undertake to see the transaction by the eye of
Teagon, with the utmost reapeet for each, I must aay that the
chanees are a thousand to one that you will blunder at every
step.

On the supposition that Worrell is responsible for his acts
the cireumstantial evidence proves certainly a larceny—ler-
eeny by him; but it does not prove that he killed Gordon,
nor that he knew he was to be killed and agreed to assiat in
the killing. It makes it probable that one or the other is true;
it raises a strong probability of that; it makes it more prob-
able that it is true, than that it is not. In a word (if he be
responsible), the evidence makes it much more probable that
he is guilty, than that he is innocent of the crime of murder.
But that is the very reason why you must acquit him.*

I come to the question of insanity. If by taking a leap in
the dark you have come to the conclusion that the defendant
either killed or assisted in the killing of Gordon; if against
the mandate of the fourth rule you have to a moral certainty
exeluded every possible aclution of the evidence but that sup-
position which is essential to any verdict of guilty; if you
have gone one step further, and found as a fact the express
malice which only ean make eapital murder, I ask you to con-

1Nore or THe Rerorter.—Here Mr. Wright entered upon the
inquiry, “If you will say (following the example of all who have
on reasoning upon circumstantial evidence) murder was com-
mitted, what is the degree of that murder?” His argument involved
a review of the facts of Bower's case, Jackson’s case, and other
cases of murder proved. Only, by circumstantial evidence, with an
application of each to the law of Missouri, first declared in the dis-
senting opinion in the case of Bower, and since adopted by all the
judges of the Supreme Court, in the eases of Dunn and Jennings,
and the proposition advanced, was that a killing under unknown
cireumstances made only murder i in the second degree. He enforeed
many decisions, laid down in his opening speech, and applied
the doctrine to the evidence in the cause, The conclusion he reached
from an analysis of the testimony tried by the legal tests, was mur-
der, not capital. We do not give even a synopsis of his argument
on this branch of the defense.

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