186 Slide – American State Trials 1918 Volume X Leo Frank Document

154 X. AMERICAN STATE TRIALS.

of killing alone, to establish the guilt of murder in the first
degree. Some of the facts and circumstances from which
the Iaw deduces the inference of malice and premeditation
eonsist in the proof of the previous threats, former grudges,
a lying-in-wait for, and seeking occasion to do some personal
injury. The statute mentions these as some of the more ob-
vious and prominent indications of deliberate malice, but there
are others equally efficient, such as killing to aceamplish some
unlawful purpose, ag to rob the person killed; a killing from
mere wantonness and disregard of human life; a killing with-
out motive and without passion; or if, in passion, without an
adequate provocation to excite it to that degree, or where the
circumstances attending the killing exhibit a depravity and
malevolence of heart, a disregard of all social duty and a
fatal propensity te erime and mischief. Such a state of facta
are the clear and unerring indications of a condition
of mind and heart which the law denominates deliber-
ate malice and premeditation, and when proved establish
the guilt of murder in the first degree. Every intentional
Killing of a human being which, from the facts and cireum-
stances established, and actually shown to exist by evidence
disclosing them, we eannot rationally ascribe to misfortune,
necessity or to the strong impulses of sudden and violent pas-
sion, is a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing in the
Meaning of the statute and is therefore murder in the first
degree. No definite length of time is required for delibera-
tion before the giving the mortal stroke to characterize the
act as a deliberate and premeditated killing.

If the slayer was for a single moment of time before strik-
ing the mortal blow in a condition of mind capable of thought
and deliberation, when free from the control of sudden and
violent passion, and did thus deliberately determine to do
the deed, it is sufficient.

But the jury should remember that passion alone, without
proof of an adequate provocation to excite it, is not sufficient
to rebut the inference of deliberate malice and premeditation,
or to extenuate the act from murder in the first degree to
some less offense. Indeed, passion without provocation is