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EDWARD D. WOREKELL. 31

it occurred. There is no proof establishing the fact that he
knew of such design prior to the act, and participated in it.
Tf he be a responsible being the evidence establishes the of-
fense of larceny. The appropriation of the horse was sabse-
quent to the death. If he counseled Bruff to fly after the
deed, or aided him in his escape, feloniously, he might be
held responsible as accessory after the fact—but he is not
charged with that offense. To make him responsible for the
murder one of two things must be made manifest beyond
Teasovable doubt. First, that Gordon fell by his hand; or,
second, that he was Killed by another, under an agreement
by which he was to be present and aid in the accomplishment
of the design; and that he was so present, and so aided, or
was there ready to aid if need be, in the perpetration of the
deed. It is indispensable to his guilt, as accessory at the fact,
that he should have knowledge of the design to kill before
the killing took place, and was present assenting to the act—
that is, assenting that the act should take place. The learned
counsel has not laid down the law to you on this point with
his acenstomed clearness. He slurred the legal proposition,
and made presence alone, without previous knowledge of the
design and concurrence in it, sufficient to render the prisoner
guilty.

Presence alone is not crime; there must be knowledge of
the crime about to be committed, and guilty concurrence in its
perpetration. The Criminal Court of St. Louis once decided
that presence at a riot raised a legal presumption that the
party present was engaged in the riot, until he proved his
innocence; but the Supreme Court stigmatized the doctrine
by a single stroke of the pen—‘‘Thig ig not law’’—and re-
versed the ease, ,

The doctrine of the law on the subject of accessory guilt
is clear, humane and reasonable; I wish~you to understand
it, as it is easy to confound it in the jargon of scientific words.
The law proceeds on the immutable principle that a man is
responsible, criminally, only for his own acts. But he may
make himself responsible for the acts of another, by making
that other his agent to act for him. If you sell your pork to

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