Reading Time: 75 minutes, [13797 words]

Revised October 15, 2026

By Brian Nelson

Atticus Haygood Henslee and Marcellus Johenning: The Post-Verdict Affidavit Campaign, the Investigation of the Jurors, the Credibility of Their Accusers, Judge Leonard S. Roan’s Decision, and the Georgia Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Bias Claims

The Defense Went After the Jury

On Monday, August 25, 1913, twelve men found Leo M. Frank guilty of murdering thirteen-year-old Mary Phagan at the National Pencil Company in Atlanta. The following day, Judge Leonard S. Roan sentenced Frank to death. Within weeks, Frank’s lawyers had begun building another case, this time against two of the men who had helped convict him. They were Atticus Haygood Henslee, a thirty-six-year-old traveling salesman, and Marcellus Johenning, a forty-six-year-old industrial employee.

Frank’s attorneys accused both men of entering the trial with their minds already made up. They claimed Henslee had discussed Frank’s guilt in several Georgia communities, sometimes using violent and anti-Jewish language. Three members of one Atlanta family accused Johenning of expressing a firm belief in Frank’s guilt months before hearing the evidence. Both jurors denied entering the jury box prejudiced and insisted their verdict had been based upon the testimony presented during the trial.

The defense investigation grew into a substantial legal and newspaper controversy involving merchants, traveling salesmen, railroad journeys, hotel registers, business orders, reluctant witnesses, sworn affidavits, and investigators following Henslee’s sales territory. The State answered with the jurors’ denials, character witnesses, business records, and statements from men who had served alongside Henslee and Johenning for nearly a month. Some evidence supported the defense, while other records created serious difficulties for its accusations.

Judge Roan understood how important the charges could become. During the new-trial hearing on Thursday, October 23, 1913, he indicated that proof of the juror accusations could make further examination of the other grounds almost unnecessary. On Friday, October 31, after reviewing the competing evidence, he denied Frank another trial.

The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the attacks on both jurors and upheld Roan’s decision on Tuesday, February 17, 1914. The Court acknowledged evidence tending to show Henslee had expressed prejudice, but also recognized his sworn denial and the substantial conflict within the testimony. Its conclusion was that, on the conflicting evidence, Roan had not abused his discretion. The Court separately upheld his determination concerning Johenning (Frank v. State, 1).

Those rulings provide the legal foundation for this study. The accusations were real, some were serious, and they deserved examination. The courts considered them and refused to overturn the verdict on those grounds. Understanding why requires looking beyond the number of affidavits and examining how the witnesses were found, how accurately they remembered dates and conversations, what independent evidence supported them, and what happened when the State challenged their accounts.

What Frank’s Lawyers Needed to Prove

Atlanta had been discussing Mary Phagan’s murder since Saturday, April 26, 1913. Newspapers filled their pages with accounts of the investigation, while people debated the evidence in offices, hotels, shops, streetcars, and private homes. A prospective juror could hardly have avoided hearing something about the case, and familiarity with newspaper coverage did not automatically establish disqualifying prejudice.

The important question was whether a man could put aside his earlier impressions and decide the case according to the evidence presented in court. Someone who said the newspaper reports looked damaging to Frank might still be willing to hear both sides. A man who had already declared that Frank was guilty and promised to convict him regardless of the evidence presented a different problem.

Frank’s attorneys argued that Henslee and Johenning belonged in the second category. Both jurors maintained that they had entered the trial willing to judge the evidence fairly. The dispute therefore involved the actual words attributed to each man, the circumstances in which those words were supposedly spoken, and whether they established a fixed opinion rather than a temporary impression.

Georgia law placed responsibility for resolving a post-verdict factual dispute of this kind with the trial judge. Roan could examine the affidavits, consider the denials, weigh credibility, and decide whether the defense had established a ground requiring another trial. The Georgia Supreme Court would then review his decision for abuse of discretion, meaning whether he had exceeded the lawful judgment permitted to him (Frank v. State, 1).

This legal framework is important because an affidavit did not automatically establish the accusation it contained, just as a juror’s denial did not automatically defeat it. Roan had to examine conflicting evidence and determine whether the claim had been sufficiently proved. The appellate court had a different responsibility and was not required to conduct a fresh hearing of every affidavit witness.

Who Was Atticus Haygood Henslee?

Atticus Haygood Henslee was born on Sunday, June 3, 1877. Lamar County genealogical records give his death as Thursday, June 14, 1956, and identify Greenwood Cemetery in Barnesville, Georgia, as his burial place. The same records identify his wife as Elizabeth May Franklin Henslee, while a Lamar County marriage index records the marriage of Atticus Henslee and May Franklin in 1900 (Lamar County Records, 6).

When Frank’s trial opened on Monday, July 28, 1913, Henslee was thirty-six years old, married, and head salesman for the Franklin Buggy Company of Barnesville. Contemporary jury descriptions placed his Atlanta residence at 74 Oak Street in the West End neighborhood. The 1912 Atlanta city directory confirms that address, while the 1914 directory describes him as a traveling salesman who had moved to Barnesville (The Atlanta Constitution, 4) (The Atlanta Journal, 5) (Atlanta City Directory, 7).

His occupation explains much of the later controversy. Henslee traveled through Georgia selling buggies and related equipment, visiting merchants, riding trains, staying in hotels, and maintaining business accounts. Like many people during the spring and summer of 1913, he sometimes discussed the Phagan murder. His work left both memories and paperwork, making it possible for Frank’s investigators to follow portions of his route and locate people who recalled conversations about the case.

That is why the later dispute involved Albany, Sparta, Monroe, Blakely, Atlanta, and other communities. The same business trail that helped the defense locate witnesses also gave the State records with which to test their recollections. Hotel registrations, signed orders, expense entries, and business acquaintances became important evidence because they could establish where Henslee had been, even when they could not establish exactly what he had said.

Henslee the Ventriloquist

One unusual detail in contemporary reporting is that Henslee was known as a ventriloquist. On Sunday, August 10, 1913, The Atlanta Journal described him entertaining the sequestered jurors by throwing his voice around their quarters. Bailiff Charles F. Huber reportedly believed he heard a woman speaking nearby and attempted to locate her, only to discover that Henslee had produced the voice as a practical joke (The Atlanta Journal, 11).

The incident has no evidentiary value concerning juror prejudice, although it explains why later reports sometimes called Henslee the ventriloquist on the Frank jury. It also provides a glimpse of the jurors’ daily life during their long confinement. Those personal details help identify the men, but they cannot establish their private opinions about Frank.

Henslee’s Later Life

Henslee remained connected with the buggy business after the trial. On Sunday, June 4, 1916, The Atlanta Georgian reported that A. H. Henslee of Barnesville had announced his candidacy for the Georgia Prison Commission. During the campaign, The Jeffersonian, associated with Thomas E. Watson, used his service on the Frank jury in political publicity (The Atlanta Georgian, 60) (The Jeffersonian, 61).

His candidacy demonstrates how the Frank controversy remained politically useful years after the verdict. It says something about Henslee’s later public identity, but nothing certain about his state of mind before the July 1913 trial. His subsequent political activity must therefore remain separate from the evidence used to challenge his original qualification as a juror.

Who Was Marcellus Johenning?

Marcellus Johenning was approximately forty-six years old during Frank’s trial. Contemporary newspaper descriptions identified him as married, employed in shipping or industrial work, and living at 161 Jones Avenue in Atlanta. Unlike Henslee, whose occupation routinely took him across Georgia, Johenning appears to have spent much of his working life in Atlanta industrial employment (The Atlanta Constitution, 4) (The Atlanta Journal, 5).

The 1912 Atlanta directory identifies “Johenning Marcellus (Annie)” as a foreman at 271 Marietta Street, with a residence at 161 Jones Avenue. Later directories continue to connect him with the same address and Hodges Broom Works. The 1914 directory describes Marcellus Johenning as a clerk, the 1916 directory uses Alfred M. Johenning, and the 1919 directory uses A. Marcellus Johenning while describing him as a timekeeper (Atlanta City Directory, 7).

The repeated address, employer, and household association strongly suggest that his fuller name may have been Alfred Marcellus Johenning. A birth certificate, marriage record, census entry, or death certificate would provide firmer confirmation. Until such a record is established, Marcellus Johenning remains the safest name to use. His reported age places his probable birth year around 1866 or 1867, but an exact birth or death date remains unverified.

The Hodges Broom Works Connection

Johenning’s employment became relevant because one of his later accusers, H. C. Loevenhart, claimed to know him through Hodges Broom Works. The city directories independently confirm Johenning’s connection with that employer, making the claimed acquaintance plausible. This supports one part of Loevenhart’s account without proving what either man said during a conversation concerning Frank’s guilt.

The difference is important. A directory can establish an employer, address, and probable acquaintance, but it cannot reproduce an unrecorded conversation. The same principle applies throughout this investigation, where documents sometimes corroborated a meeting or location while leaving the alleged prejudicial words unresolved.

Johenning Was Observed During the Trial

Johenning appears in contemporary reporting from the trial itself. On Friday, August 1, 1913, The Atlanta Journal described him asking for further explanation of the National Pencil Company time-clock system during N. V. Darley’s testimony. Darley approached the jury box and explained how the clock recorded employees’ punches and the gaps between them (The Atlanta Journal, 8).

This small incident shows Johenning actively seeking an explanation of evidence rather than sitting silently throughout the proceedings. A juror who possessed an improper prior opinion could still ask questions, so the incident cannot establish impartiality by itself. It does provide contemporary evidence of his behavior during the very trial the defense later claimed had been compromised.

Another contemporary report described Johenning displaying emotion during Frank’s lengthy unsworn statement. The observation proves neither prejudice nor impartiality, but it contributes to the record of how he behaved while listening to the case (The Atlanta Georgian, 9).

Tarleton Collier’s August 24 Portrait

On Sunday, August 24, 1913, one day before the verdict, journalist Tarleton Collier published a study of the twelve jurors in Hearst’s Sunday American, titled “Frank Jurors an Enthralling Study in Human Emotion.” Collier attempted to describe the men through their courtroom behavior and facial expressions, portraying Johenning as “plainly indecisive and nervous” and apparently responsive to evidence presented by both sides (Collier, 10).

This was a reporter’s impression rather than sworn evidence. Collier could not know Johenning’s private thoughts by studying his face, and his descriptions should never be treated as a scientific assessment of impartiality. The timing nevertheless gives the article historical interest, because it appeared before the verdict and months before the accusations against Johenning were argued in court.

A reporter closely observing the jury did not portray Johenning as visibly displaying an opinion fixed before the trial. That does not prove he was impartial, but it provides contemporary context for the later affidavits of men who had served beside him.

Monday, August 25, 1913: The Verdict

The jury returned a guilty verdict on Monday afternoon, August 25, 1913, and Judge Roan sentenced Frank the following day. One aspect of the deliberations later became central to the attack upon Henslee: how many ballots had been taken, and whether one juror initially refused to vote guilty.

The newspapers published conflicting accounts on Tuesday, August 26. The Atlanta Constitution reported that only one ballot had been taken, while The Atlanta Georgian similarly described a first-ballot guilty verdict. The Atlanta Journal, however, reported an initial vote of ten for conviction, one blank, and one doubtful, followed approximately one hour later by unanimity (The Atlanta Constitution, 12) (The Atlanta Georgian, 13) (The Atlanta Journal, 14).

This disagreement existed immediately after the verdict and should not be quietly corrected to fit a later account. Its importance is that the doubtful-ballot story was already in print before the public controversy over Henslee’s alleged prejudice developed in October.

Henslee Identifies Himself as the Doubtful Voter

During the later new-trial proceeding, Henslee and several fellow jurors described an initial ballot with one doubtful vote, followed by further discussion and a unanimous verdict. Henslee identified himself as the doubtful voter and explained that the jurors who had already expressed opinions favored guilt. He said he voted doubtful to require fuller discussion because the verdict could result in Frank’s execution (New-Trial Record, 3).

Foreman F. E. Winburn and other jurors supported important portions of the account. F. V. L. Smith also described Henslee as expressing caution about how strong the evidence should be before convicting a man of murder, while still withholding his final position during the trial.

The exact numbers in the later affidavits do not perfectly match the Journal’s August 26 report, and the surviving material does not completely reconcile them. The early newspaper supports the existence of a divided preliminary vote, while the later affidavits identify Henslee as the doubtful voter and describe his reason. Those are related but separate propositions.

Why the Doubtful Ballot Helps Henslee

The ballot creates a difficulty for the strongest version of Frank’s defense theory. Reuben Arnold later portrayed Henslee as a man who entered the jury with a hidden determination to convict, yet according to Henslee and the fellow-juror affidavits, his doubtful vote delayed unanimity and required additional discussion.

If the other eleven men already favored conviction, a guilty vote from Henslee would have produced an immediate unanimous decision. Instead, his claimed vote required further consideration of the evidence. This does not prove he never made prejudicial comments earlier, because someone may speak confidently in a casual conversation and become more cautious when an actual death sentence is at stake.

The ballot nevertheless weakens the simple picture of a juror whose sole purpose was to force the earliest possible conviction. It was conduct occurring inside the jury room, rather than a later recollection of an informal conversation, and several fellow jurors supported Henslee’s explanation.

Rosser’s Theory That the Ballot Was a Trick

On Wednesday, October 29, Luther Rosser attacked the doubtful ballot during the closing arguments. The Atlanta Journal reported Rosser suggesting Henslee had used the ballot to trick his fellow jurors and calling the episode a “miserable, dirty farce” (The Atlanta Journal, 54).

The accusation deserves examination because no fellow juror described Henslee announcing a secret plan, and no affidavit established that he pretended doubt for the purpose of manipulating the other men. The defense did not identify a clear method by which delaying unanimity advanced the supposed scheme. Rosser could fairly argue that a doubtful vote did not erase earlier prejudicial statements, but his stronger claim of a hidden trick required evidence beyond speculation.

Another timing problem arises if the ballot is portrayed as a plan to protect Henslee from the later investigation. Henslee cast his ballot on August 25, while the extensive search for his earlier conversations developed afterward. No identified evidence establishes that he knew he would become a principal target of Frank’s amended motion. The doubtful ballot therefore deserves meaningful, although limited, weight in Henslee’s favor.

The Defense Begins Building the Juror Case

Frank’s lawyers began looking for evidence against the jury after the verdict. Their investigators followed Henslee’s business route, visited communities where he sold buggies, questioned merchants and acquaintances, gathered affidavits, and used legal procedures when witnesses resisted participation. Attorney Stiles Hopkins helped obtain depositions, while C. W. Burke was publicly identified as an agent working for Luther Rosser.

The investigation was energetic and organized. Frank had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, so his attorneys had every legitimate reason to examine possible juror misconduct. The historical question concerns the reliability and independence of the resulting evidence, because the investigation was directed toward finding statements helpful to Frank rather than surveying every person who had spoken with Henslee.

That affects the meaning of the affidavit count. A collection found through a targeted search can uncover truthful evidence, but it can also emphasize one side of a person’s conversational history. People who remembered nothing damaging would rarely become prominent defense witnesses, while people who recalled strong statements would attract attention. The resulting affidavits therefore required individual examination rather than acceptance through their cumulative number.

September 2, 1913: The First Loevenhart Affidavits

The attack upon Johenning developed quickly. H. C. Loevenhart and Miriam Loevenhart executed affidavits dated Tuesday, September 2, 1913, only eight days after the verdict. Both documents were notarized by C. W. Burke (Loevenhart Affidavits, 16).

H. C. Loevenhart said he knew Johenning through Hodges Broom Works and alleged that during May 1913 Johenning discussed Mary Phagan’s murder while expressing a firm conviction that Frank was guilty. Miriam described a conversation involving herself and her mother on Forsyth Street, attributing to Johenning the declaration, “I know that he is guilty.” She characterized his words as firm and nearly vehement and alleged similar expressions on more than one occasion before trial.

If accurately remembered, these were serious accusations of prejudgment. Their importance depended upon whether the judge believed the family’s account of the conversations and whether those words established a settled opinion rather than an impression based on newspaper coverage.

September 26, 1913: Jennie Loevenhart’s Affidavit

The original Exhibit F gives Friday, September 26, 1913, as the date of Jennie G. Loevenhart’s affidavit. This corrects earlier versions that placed all three family affidavits on September 2. Jennie described a May encounter on Forsyth Street with Miriam present, alleging that Johenning expressed a firm personal conviction that Frank was guilty (Jennie Loevenhart Affidavit, 17).

C. W. Burke administered the oath. The twenty-four-day gap between the first two family affidavits and Jennie’s affidavit deserves notice, although the documents do not explain why her statement was executed later. The chronology establishes that the family evidence was formally assembled in stages, without establishing anything improper about the interval.

Three Affidavits, Two Principal Encounters

The structure of the accusation is important. H. C. described one conversation, while Jennie and Miriam described an encounter together. Miriam referred to additional remarks without providing a complete separate date and location for each, so the three affidavits did not establish three fully independent, documented conversations.

The family relationship does not prove dishonesty or collusion. It does invite examination of how independently the members developed their recollections, especially because they were remembering conversations months earlier after Frank had already been convicted. The judge had to determine whether the family remembered a fixed personal judgment or understood a newspaper-based opinion more strongly than Johenning intended.

Johenning’s Sworn Answer

Johenning denied the separate conversation alleged by H. C. Loevenhart but acknowledged speaking with Jennie and Miriam. His version was materially different. According to Johenning, Mrs. Loevenhart asked what he thought about the case, and he referred to how unfavorable the newspaper accounts made Frank’s position appear. When Miriam pressed him for his own opinion, he said he had only read the newspapers and possessed no firsthand knowledge (Johenning Affidavit, 25).

Johenning maintained that the trial would determine guilt or innocence. This answer went directly to the legal issue because he did not deny every contact with the family. He acknowledged the principal encounter and disputed the words and meaning attributed to him.

The Loevenharts remembered certainty, while Johenning remembered a provisional impression and an intention to judge the trial evidence. His own chronology was not perfectly precise, and he associated the encounter with a later period than the family did. Both accounts required evaluation as retrospective memories rather than contemporary recordings.

Was the Loevenhart Family Pressured?

No identified affidavit or contemporary newspaper account establishes that H. C., Jennie, or Miriam Loevenhart complained of being threatened, bribed, or forced to make a false statement. Burke’s role as notary documents his participation in taking their affidavits, but it does not establish the manner in which the words were collected or whether the family was improperly influenced.

This should remain separate from the documented reluctance of several Henslee witnesses. The evidence against Johenning deserves close scrutiny for its limited independence, conflicting accounts, and incomplete context, but it does not support a claim of proven coercion.

September 4, 1913: Gremer and Farkas Accuse Henslee in Albany

R. L. Gremer and Mack Farkas executed affidavits on Thursday, September 4, before L. L. Ford in Dougherty County. The accusations concerned a conversation near Sam Farkas’s business on Broad Street in Albany. Gremer alleged that Henslee expressed certainty concerning Frank’s guilt, although he could not provide the exact date and partly identified Henslee through newspaper photographs published after the verdict (Gremer and Farkas Affidavits, 18).

Mack Farkas described the same general setting but was less definite about the words. He acknowledged difficulty recalling the exact language and remembered Henslee expressing belief in Frank’s guilt. The two accounts provided some corroboration of an unfavorable conversation, but they were not equally precise. Gremer’s emphatic wording cannot automatically be assigned to Farkas simply because both men described the same setting.

Identification Through Newspaper Photographs

Gremer’s reliance upon newspaper photographs deserves scrutiny because he connected the remembered speaker with an image of Henslee published after the verdict. The identification may have been correct, but the affidavit does not establish that Gremer independently identified the speaker by name at the time of the conversation.

Nor does the record establish that his later identification was insulated from publicity surrounding the case. A judge could therefore accept the possibility of an Albany conversation while examining the identification and remembered words carefully.

The July 8 Albany Documents Contradicted Henslee

The strongest independent evidence against Henslee concerned his business travels. In his sworn answer, he broadly denied visiting Albany between an early-June trip and September 18, 1913. Frank’s attorneys discovered records showing he had been there on Tuesday, July 8.

A Franklin Buggy Company order carried Henslee’s name as salesman. Mack Farkas, B. W. Simon, and Sam Farkas authenticated the order through affidavits, while W. W. Little, head clerk at the New Albany Hotel, identified Henslee’s July 8 registration and his assignment to room 79 (Franklin Buggy Company Order, 26) (Little Affidavit, 27).

This was substantial documentary evidence showing that Henslee’s sworn travel reconstruction contained an important error. Frank’s lawyers were entitled to use the contradiction against his credibility, and any serious defense of Roan’s ruling must acknowledge the weakness rather than explain it away.

What the Albany Documents Proved

The order established a business transaction associated with Henslee on July 8, while the hotel register established his presence in Albany. Those facts strengthened the possibility of an encounter with the Farkas business, but they did not independently establish the prejudicial words attributed to him. A sales order does not record a conversation about Frank, and a hotel register cannot reveal the speaker’s private opinion.

The contradiction damaged Henslee’s travel memory without automatically proving Gremer’s strongest language or the ultimate allegation that Henslee entered the jury intending to convict regardless of the evidence. Roan could recognize the mistake and still find the overall juror-bias showing insufficient.

What the July 8 Buggy Order Actually Recorded

The reproduced Franklin Buggy Company order listed four buggies at $62.50 each and two rubber sets at $15 each, for a merchandise total of $280. The document bears the date July 8, 1913, identifies Sam Farkas in Albany, and names Henslee as salesman (Franklin Buggy Company Order, 26).

During argument, State attorney Frank Hooper was reported as referring to eight buggies, although the original exhibit should control the quantity. Hooper argued that a salesman seeking a substantial order would have little reason to insult a customer through religiously offensive remarks (The Atlanta Journal, 52).

This was an argument about ordinary business behavior rather than proof of what Henslee said. A successful sale does not make an offensive remark impossible, and the original Albany affiants did not attribute precisely the same religious language alleged in Samuel Aron’s separate Elks Club account. The value of the order lies principally in its documented date, transaction, and identification of Henslee.

September 12, 1913: Julian Lehman Makes Two Accusations

Julian A. Lehman executed his first affidavit on Friday, September 12. He alleged Henslee made strong statements concerning Frank during two travel encounters, one associated with Monday, June 2, during travel involving Atlanta and Experiment, Georgia, and another associated with Friday, June 20 (Lehman Affidavit, 19).

Lehman attributed emphatic language to Henslee concerning Frank’s guilt and punishment. The original affidavit appeared specific, which initially strengthened the accusation. Its dating later became an important weakness when Henslee and the State reconstructed his business itinerary.

Henslee’s Expense Book

Henslee maintained an expense book recording business travel and expenditures. He asserted that the entries were made during his trips, making them useful for comparing remembered conversations with a contemporary account of his movements. The records did not consistently favor Henslee, since his broad Albany denial was contradicted by independent evidence from July 8.

On June 2, however, the travel material supported Henslee against Lehman’s original account. This is an important example of why documentary evidence should be applied consistently rather than celebrated only when it supports a preferred side.

Joe Murray and the June 2 Hotel Registration

Joe Murray, a clerk at the New Albany Hotel, swore that Henslee registered for lodging on June 2 and spent the night in Albany. Henslee’s expense material also placed him in southwestern Georgia, creating a significant problem for Lehman’s claimed date and route (New-Trial Record, 3).

An overnight hotel registration does not establish where Henslee spent every hour earlier that day. A conclusive all-day alibi would require the alleged conversation’s time, railroad schedules, and realistic travel arrangements. The combined evidence nevertheless challenged the precision of Lehman’s original account and gave Roan a substantial reason to question its chronology.

Lehman’s Supplemental Affidavit

Lehman executed a supplemental affidavit on Monday, October 13, 1913. He continued to insist the prejudicial conversations occurred before trial, but became less certain of the dates. One encounter was described as occurring on or about June 20, while the other was placed near June 2 without claiming certainty about the exact day (Lehman Supplemental Affidavit, 28).

A witness can honestly remember the substance of an event while being uncertain about the date. The change still weakened the apparent precision of Lehman’s first affidavit because a conversation tied firmly to June 2 could be tested against that day’s travel records, while a general early-June claim was harder to examine. The documents do not establish why Lehman qualified his dates, so the proper conclusion is that his revised chronology was less certain rather than demonstrably dishonest.

Henslee Confronts Lehman

The conflict became personal. The Atlanta Georgian of Tuesday, October 7 reported Henslee confronting Lehman and threatening to seek criminal action over an accusation that made Henslee appear dishonest. Lehman did not withdraw his allegation (The Atlanta Georgian, 36).

This episode shows that pressure existed on more than one side. Defense investigators pursued witnesses, while Henslee confronted an accuser who had challenged his sworn credibility. Neither action independently established the truth or falsity of the alleged conversation.

September 26, 1913: Three Sparta Witnesses Testify

The Sparta accusation concerned Shi Gray, John M. Holmes, and a witness identified as T. M. Johnson in the formal deposition and S. M. Johnson in the contemporary newspaper letter. The original testimony was taken on Friday, September 26, before J. W. Lewis in Hancock County. The witnesses described a discussion at the Walker & Holmes office in Sparta (Sparta Depositions, 20).

Gray recalled several men discussing Frank’s guilt for approximately twenty minutes to half an hour. Johnson said some participants expressed belief in guilt while others disagreed, while Holmes described Henslee answering firmly when asked whether he believed Frank guilty. These accounts offered corroboration of one general office conversation rather than evidence of three separate incidents.

The disagreement over Johnson’s initials should remain visible until another contemporary record resolves it. Changing the name silently would create unnecessary uncertainty about the identity of a witness in an already complicated documentary dispute.

The Sparta Depositions Contained Leading Questions

The original written questions reveal how the defense developed the Sparta testimony. Witnesses were asked to examine a newspaper photograph and identify Henslee, then asked whether they had heard him discuss Frank’s guilt before trial. Some questions invited the witnesses to describe conversations in their own words, while others contained specific suggested details.

One question introduced a claim that Henslee had offered to wager money that he would serve on the Frank jury. The witnesses’ answers did not uniformly adopt that proposed detail. Holmes answered by saying Henslee had been summoned, while Johnson answered that Henslee said he had been drawn and might have to serve (Sparta Depositions, 20).

This difference is important because a lawyer’s question may contain an allegation that a witness never fully confirms. The question itself is not proof that a wager occurred, and similar prepared questions may produce similar answers. Matching language is less impressive when the witnesses are all responding to the same written form.

The method does not establish that the defense coached witnesses to lie. It requires historians to separate the details suggested by attorneys from those actually adopted under oath, particularly when a prepared question contains several propositions and the answer confirms only one.

The Sparta Jury-Summons Problem

The timing of the alleged conversation became one of the strongest objections to the Sparta testimony. Holmes dated the discussion to Friday, June 27, 1913, while he and Johnson remembered Henslee speaking as though he had already been drawn or summoned for jury service.

Henslee swore that he first learned of his summons on Friday, July 25, when he found the notice at his Atlanta residence, 74 Oak Street, around five in the afternoon. He said he then reported for service when the trial opened Monday, July 28 (Henslee Affidavit, 24).

If both accounts are taken literally, the chronology does not fit. A man who first learned of his summons on July 25 could not have referred in June to knowing of that same summons. The contradiction does not prove the office discussion never occurred, particularly because Henslee admitted being in Sparta during the relevant period, but it leaves a significant disagreement over timing and memory.

The jury-service detail was important because it connected the supposed opinion of guilt with Henslee’s prospective role in the trial. If that detail was remembered incorrectly, the court had reason to examine the reliability of the accompanying recollection.

Henslee’s September 2 Explanation

Henslee offered an answer more specific than a general denial. He said he returned to Sparta on Tuesday, September 2, after Frank’s conviction, and admitted discussing the case strongly during that visit. By then he had heard the trial evidence, participated in the guilty verdict, and developed a judgment he no longer needed to withhold.

Henslee argued that the Sparta witnesses had attached those post-verdict statements to an earlier meeting. His explanation appeared publicly in three Atlanta newspapers on Tuesday, October 7. The Atlanta Constitution summarized his position in its headline, “Made His Remarks About Leo Frank After Trial and Not Before, Says Juror Accused of Prejudice” (The Atlanta Constitution, 35).

This was a meaningful answer because Henslee did not deny every harsh phrase. He disputed the timing, which was central to the legal claim. A strong opinion expressed after conviction had a different significance from a fixed opinion announced before jury service.

The Sparta Witnesses Rejected His Explanation

The three men refused to accept Henslee’s version. In a letter published Monday, October 6, they maintained that the discussion occurred before trial and described it as sufficiently memorable to have become known around Sparta. On Friday, October 17, The Atlanta Georgian reported them again standing behind their chronology (The Atlanta Constitution, 34) (The Atlanta Georgian, 41).

The conflict was direct. Henslee said they moved a post-verdict conversation backward into June, while the witnesses said Henslee was moving a pretrial conversation forward into September. The surviving records do not settle which explanation was correct, leaving Roan to decide how much weight to place on the conflicting sworn accounts.

The Sparta Witnesses Were Reluctant

The Sparta men acknowledged they had not wanted to become involved. Their public letter explained that some had known Henslee and his family for years and did not wish to injure him. They said they declined voluntary affidavits and eventually testified through formal procedures (The Atlanta Constitution, 34).

Their reluctance deserves consideration because it does not fit a simple picture of men eagerly seeking publicity. It also demonstrates that the defense actively pursued people who did not originally wish to participate. Reluctance is neither proof of dishonesty nor proof of accuracy, and a court summons can require testimony without making the witness’s memory correct.

Monroe: J. J. Nunnally and Dr. W. L. Ricker

The Monroe accusation is especially important because Henslee admitted discussing the Frank case there. J. J. Nunnally described a lengthy discussion at Nunnally & Harris and said Henslee argued forcefully that Frank was guilty, while also predicting Frank might not escape Atlanta alive even if acquitted. Dr. W. L. Ricker attributed explicitly anti-Jewish language to Henslee (Monroe Depositions, 21).

Henslee denied the damaging words but acknowledged discussing Mary’s murder. He maintained that he had expressed only the general view that whoever killed Mary deserved hanging, and he disputed both the length of the conversation and the alleged prediction of violence.

The Monroe Date

Henslee placed his Monroe visit on Sunday, June 22, 1913. That date deserves care because it fell on a Sunday, but the unusual day does not make the visit impossible. It may reflect a genuine Sunday visit, an error in Henslee’s travel recollection, or incomplete context (Henslee Affidavit, 24).

The record should be presented as it reads rather than silently changed to a more convenient weekday. The actual disagreement concerned the duration, intensity, and content of the conversation.

What the Monroe Evidence Could Establish

The admitted encounter gave the defense stronger evidence of opportunity than in an alleged meeting Henslee denied altogether. The dispute concerned what was said, with Ricker present for only part of the discussion. His recollection could corroborate what he personally heard without confirming every statement Nunnally attributed to a longer exchange.

The witnesses later reaffirmed their accusations while acknowledging uncertainty about the exact month of the original conversation. Their persistence is relevant, although their uncertainty limits the precision of the chronology. A prediction that a crowd might harm Frank after acquittal is also different from a personal promise to participate in violence, so the words and their surrounding context must remain separate.

Virgil V. Harris Was Not an Accuser

Virgil V. Harris was incorrectly associated with the Monroe accusation in early reporting. He corrected the record in a letter dated Tuesday, October 7, and published Wednesday, October 8, denying that he had made an affidavit and explaining that he was away from Monroe at the relevant time (The Atlanta Journal, 37).

Nunnally’s deposition likewise described Harris as absent. Harris should therefore not be counted among the direct witnesses accusing Henslee, and his correction demonstrates how an investigative list or newspaper report can make a supposed witness appear more important than the actual sworn record permits.

The episode does not disprove the testimony of Nunnally or Ricker. It demonstrates why the affidavit count must be reconstructed from the original papers rather than accepted from an early newspaper summary.

C. P. Stough: The Streetcar Accusation

C. P. Stough accused Henslee of expressing a strong belief in Frank’s guilt during a College Park streetcar journey into Atlanta. Stough associated the conversation with the period when Jim Conley’s statements were receiving public attention, but he did not establish an exact calendar date. He attributed to Henslee a desire to assist in inflicting punishment upon Frank (Stough Deposition, 22).

Henslee denied the accusation. The dispute concerned both the remembered words and the circumstances in which Stough’s account was obtained, because Stough gave unusually detailed public information about the investigators who pursued him.

Stough Said Investigators Pursued Him for Two Weeks

On Friday, October 3, The Atlanta Georgian reported that Stough initially kept quiet about the conversation. According to his account, a friend told Rosser about the incident, after which two defense investigators approached him repeatedly over approximately two weeks. Stough declined to volunteer information and eventually received a summons (The Atlanta Georgian, 32).

This is direct evidence of persistent efforts to obtain testimony. It does not prove the investigators forced Stough to lie, but it establishes that his accusation emerged through an active search, repeated approaches, and compulsory legal process.

The Conversation Was Not Fully Reproduced

Stough described Henslee speaking positively about Frank’s guilt, while also acknowledging that he himself had spoken emphatically during the exchange. The deposition does not preserve Stough’s entire side of the conversation, creating a limitation because the meaning of Henslee’s reply may depend on what prompted it.

The State introduced reputation evidence against Stough, including testimony from Lou Castro and H. L. Bennett. Those attacks did not establish falsehood, but they gave Roan conflicting evidence about the credibility of a witness responsible for an especially forceful accusation (New-Trial Record, 3).

Samuel Aron: The Strongest Anti-Jewish Accusation

Samuel Aron executed his affidavit on Friday, October 3, 1913, claiming that Henslee made a hostile statement at the Elks Club on Ellis Street shortly after Frank’s indictment. Aron alleged anti-Jewish abuse, approval of lynching, and a declaration that Henslee would vote to hang Frank if chosen for the jury (Aron Affidavit, 23).

If true, the accusation would have been powerful evidence of prejudgment and religious hostility. It went far beyond a passing opinion formed through newspaper coverage, making Aron’s reliability unusually important to the defense case.

Aron’s Identification

Aron said he did not originally know the speaker by name and later identified him as Henslee. The affidavit does not fully document how the identification was established after the event, leaving a reasonable question about whether the remembered speaker was correctly identified.

This does not prove Aron was mistaken. It means the accusation depended partly upon an identification made after the verdict, rather than one independently recorded when the conversation occurred.

Henslee Denied Aron’s Account

Henslee acknowledged being at the Elks Club around the relevant period but denied the inflammatory language and hostility toward Jewish people. He referred to Jewish acquaintances and fellow club members as part of his sworn answer (Henslee Affidavit, 24).

Such relationships do not make prejudice impossible. They were part of the evidence Roan could consider alongside the allegation and the State’s additional attacks on Aron’s credibility.

The State Attacked Aron’s Reputation

The State introduced affidavits from people challenging Aron’s reputation for truthfulness, including H. R. Pitts, W. L. Lyle, T. W. Webb, John R. Flournoy, and Lou Castro. The Atlanta Constitution of Wednesday, October 22 also reported that Aron was free on bond concerning a pending larceny accusation (The Atlanta Constitution, 44).

A pending criminal accusation does not establish that Aron lied, and an unfavorable reputation affidavit cannot prove a disputed conversation never occurred. The judge nevertheless had grounds to examine the credibility of the witness responsible for the most inflammatory anti-Jewish allegation. The evidence was contested rather than one-sided.

Leon Harrison: Another Allegation of Prejudgment

Leon Harrison executed an affidavit dated Wednesday, October 8, describing a conversation he allegedly overheard while walking on Peachtree Street toward Five Points. Harrison said he did not personally know Henslee at the time and later identified him through newspaper photographs. He attributed a firm opinion of Frank’s guilt and an intention to convict if selected for jury service (Harrison Affidavit, 29).

The accusation faced several limitations. The other speaker was not identified, Harrison heard the exchange while passing nearby, and the identification occurred after the event. The conversation was also reconstructed months later, leaving questions concerning how much Harrison heard and how accurately he remembered it.

The Religious-Language Problem

Harrison’s version referred to Frank’s Jewish identity, but the actual attribution is important. The religious reference belonged to the other participant in the alleged conversation and should not be reassigned to Henslee as another direct anti-Jewish statement.

Harrison remains an accuser of alleged prejudgment. The clearest direct anti-Jewish allegations against Henslee came from Aron and Ricker, and keeping their individual accounts separate prevents the religious-prejudice evidence from being enlarged beyond the record.

Blakely: A Promising Accusation Collapsed

One of the most useful tests of the defense investigation occurred in Blakely, Georgia. A rumor alleged that Henslee had said he would remain on the jury until Christmas rather than release Frank. Frank’s lawyers pursued L. E. Black and Walter Thomas, who resisted voluntary involvement and were eventually questioned through legal process (The Atlanta Constitution, 15).

Their testimony did not confirm the damaging remark. Both acknowledged discussing newspaper accounts, but neither said Henslee expressed the alleged determination to convict Frank. This was evidence favorable to Henslee produced through the defense’s own investigation.

Why Blakely Is Important

Blakely demonstrates that a strong rumor did not necessarily survive sworn examination. The defense pursued a lead capable of supporting a new trial, yet the expected accusation failed when the supposed witnesses were formally questioned.

The episode does not disprove the Albany, Sparta, Monroe, or Elks Club allegations. It demonstrates why investigative leads should not be confused with established testimony, and why a comprehensive history must include unsuccessful leads alongside affidavits the defense ultimately used.

October 1, 1913: The Two Jurors Become Formal Grounds

On Wednesday, October 1, The Atlanta Journal reported that Frank’s attorneys had served an amended motion containing 115 grounds. The newspaper prominently identified Henslee and Johenning as the two jurors accused of prejudice (The Atlanta Journal, 30).

The motion challenged numerous rulings concerning evidence, the judge’s instructions, courtroom conduct, public excitement, and the qualifications of the jurors. It represented a broad attempt to overturn the conviction, within which the two-juror issue developed into one of the most heavily contested grounds.

The Number of Grounds Later Changed

The newspapers initially used 115 grounds, but the reported number changed as the hearing proceeded. The October 31 Journal referred to 102 remaining grounds, while the appellate record subsequently referred to 103.

Those figures concern different stages of the motion and record certification. A complete reconciliation would require comparing successive versions line by line, rather than assuming one newspaper necessarily made an error. For this study, the essential point is that the Georgia Supreme Court identified Henslee’s juror-bias accusation as Ground 73 (Frank v. State, 1) (The Atlanta Journal, 56).

October 2–5, 1913: The Jurors Deny Prejudice Publicly

Johenning responded publicly when the accusations became widely known. On Thursday, October 2, The Atlanta Georgian reported him denying that he had entered the trial prejudiced. He explained that jury service cost him money and disrupted his work, yet he had fulfilled the obligation because he considered it his duty (The Atlanta Georgian, 31).

On Saturday, October 4, The Atlanta Journal printed Henslee’s response. He rejected the allegations attributed to Stough and others, maintained that he had qualified honestly, and denied entering the case determined to convict. The following day, the Journal reported both jurors defending their conduct and Johenning insisting that his verdict rested upon the evidence introduced at trial (The Atlanta Journal, 33) (The Atlanta Journal, 34).

These statements do not automatically establish impartiality. Their timing shows the jurors defending themselves openly while the investigation was still expanding, rather than waiting until the State had finished preparing its counter-affidavit campaign.

October 6–8: The Sparta Controversy Becomes Public

The Sparta witnesses sent a letter challenging Henslee’s denial, which The Atlanta Constitution published Monday, October 6. Henslee answered publicly on Tuesday, October 7, insisting that the harsh statements remembered by the witnesses belonged to his post-verdict visit. Newspapers that day also described his dispute with Julian Lehman (The Atlanta Constitution, 34) (The Atlanta Constitution, 35).

On Wednesday, October 8, The Atlanta Journal published Virgil Harris’s correction denying that he had given an affidavit against Henslee. These reports show the controversy developing in public while the attorneys continued looking for witnesses, creating opportunities for newspaper accounts to affect how later participants understood the allegations (The Atlanta Journal, 37).

The publicity does not prove that a particular witness changed his memory. It does establish that the investigation did not occur in isolation from public discussion of the charges.

October 8: Stiles Hopkins Defends the Accusers

Attorney Stiles Hopkins publicly defended the standing of the witnesses whose statements he had helped obtain. The Atlanta Georgian of Wednesday, October 8 described Hopkins investigating their reputations and portraying them as people of prominence and honesty. He welcomed attacks upon their credibility because the defense intended to answer with supporting character evidence (The Atlanta Georgian, 38).

This was an important part of the strategy. The attorneys anticipated that Dorsey would challenge the witnesses and began assembling another body of sworn statements defending their reputations. That process produced additional affidavits without producing additional direct witnesses to the alleged conversations, a difference that should remain clear when discussing the total number of papers.

The Character Witnesses Supporting the Defense Accusers

The defense obtained reputation testimony from numerous people. For Nunnally and Ricker, supporting affiants included R. C. Knight, H. G. Howell, O. Roberts, J. B. Shelnutt, and Judge Alonzo C. Stone. The Sparta witnesses received extensive support from local citizens, including W. H. Burwell, Henry H. Little, Frank L. Little, T. M. Hunt, H. D. Chapman, Thomas F. Fleming, H. L. Middlebrooks, G. W. Brier, R. E. Wheeler, D. E. Wiley, A. H. Birdsong, E. A. Rozier Sr., J. D. Bennett, and Hancock County Sheriff T. B. Hightower.

Additional reputation affidavits supported Lehman and Stough. The record associates W. P. Upshaw, S. E. Berman, Henry M. Kennedy, G. W. Mizell, and R. P. Spencer Jr. with support for Lehman, while A. L. Guthman, L. P. Stephens, and A. H. Van Dyke supported Stough (New-Trial Record, 3).

These names show the defense’s effort to protect its witnesses from impeachment. Their testimony concerned general reputation, not firsthand knowledge of the disputed conversations. A respected witness can still remember a date incorrectly or misunderstand a speaker, so reputation and the accuracy of a particular recollection remain separate questions.

October 13–20: Both Sides Strengthen Their Cases

On Monday, October 13, The Atlanta Georgian reported renewed accusations from Nunnally and Ricker, who reaffirmed their position concerning the Monroe conversation and rejected Henslee’s explanation. On Tuesday, October 14, the same newspaper described Dorsey preparing his counter-showing against the juror-bias allegations (The Atlanta Georgian, 39) (The Atlanta Georgian, 40).

On Friday, October 17, the Sparta witnesses again insisted Henslee had spoken before trial. The following Monday, newspaper coverage described Leon Harrison’s additional accusation (The Atlanta Georgian, 41) (The Atlanta Georgian, 42).

The public dispute continued to expand as the lawyers prepared for the hearing. The defense was adding accusations and supporting character statements, while the State was gathering counter-affidavits, examining the witnesses’ reputations, and reconstructing disputed dates.

October 21–22: The State Answers With Approximately Thirty Affidavits

The State eventually produced a large counter-showing. On Tuesday, October 21, The Atlanta Georgian described approximately thirty affidavits opposing Frank’s request for another trial. The next day, The Atlanta Constitution reported many affidavits defending the jury (The Atlanta Georgian, 43) (The Atlanta Constitution, 44).

The papers served different purposes. Some supported Henslee and Johenning, others attacked particular defense witnesses, and still others concerned the separate allegations of cheering, intimidation, and improper contact with jurors.

The total was substantial, but it did not mean thirty independent people had personally observed the two jurors enter the trial impartial. Each affidavit had its own subject and evidentiary limits, just as each defense affidavit had to be examined for what its writer actually knew.

The Fellow Jurors Defended Henslee and Johenning

The State obtained statements from several members of the Frank jury, including F. E. Winburn, M. S. Woodward, D. Townsend, A. L. Wisbey, W. M. Jeffries, J. T. Ozburn, F. V. L. Smith, C. J. Bosshardt, and W. F. Medcalf. Their statements generally described Henslee and Johenning as attentive and conscientious during the twenty-nine days of jury service. Some supported the doubtful-ballot account, while others said the accused jurors did not disclose a fixed position while the evidence was being heard (New-Trial Record, 3).

These witnesses had spent nearly a month in close contact with Henslee and Johenning. Their evidence deserves weight because they could observe the men during the very proceedings allegedly compromised by concealed prejudice.

Its limits should also be recognized. They could not know what Henslee had said privately in Albany or Sparta months earlier, nor could they know exactly what Johenning said to the Loevenharts on Forsyth Street. Their affidavits concerned observed conduct rather than a complete reconstruction of earlier conversations.

The Other Jurors Had an Interest

The fellow jurors had participated in the verdict, and an accusation that two members had secretly concealed prejudice reflected upon the integrity of their entire jury. That common interest does not make their affidavits false, but it means their statements should receive the same scrutiny applied to the defense affidavits.

The question remains what each witness could actually know. A juror who spent twenty-nine days beside Henslee had meaningful evidence concerning his conduct during service, but not necessarily firsthand knowledge of his earlier conversations elsewhere in Georgia.

The State’s Character Evidence Supporting Henslee

The State produced reputation affidavits supporting Henslee, including those associated with W. M. Howard, J. C. Collier, T. W. Cochran, P. L. Cordy, J. E. Howard, J. D. Lockridge, and C. O. Summers (New-Trial Record, 3).

Such testimony could help Roan evaluate Henslee’s general trustworthiness, but it could not independently prove that he had never used the words attributed to him. The same standard applies to the defense’s reputation evidence. Character may affect credibility, while the date and substance of a particular conversation still require separate examination.

The State’s Character Evidence Supporting Johenning

The State likewise produced favorable testimony concerning Johenning. W. N. Weaver, O. H. Puckett, T. W. McGarrity, and W. C. Robinson described him as conscientious and trustworthy (New-Trial Record, 3).

This evidence helped answer the Loevenhart accusations, although its value was indirect. The witnesses were not claiming to have been present during the family’s conversations. They addressed Johenning’s reputation and character, leaving Roan to decide the disputed words from the competing accounts.

The State’s Impeachment Witnesses

Dorsey challenged selected defense accusers through reputation affidavits. M. G. Staten and T. S. Hawes challenged R. L. Gremer, while H. R. Pitts, W. L. Lyle, T. W. Webb, John R. Flournoy, and others attacked Samuel Aron. H. L. Bennett and Lou Castro challenged Stough, while other impeachment affidavits concerned W. P. Neill, whose separate allegation involved outside contact with a juror (New-Trial Record, 3).

This is why the juror dispute cannot fairly be described as eleven accusers opposed only by Henslee’s denial. There was a much larger credibility contest, with some witnesses receiving extensive character support and others facing direct impeachment. Some allegations had documentary corroboration of a location, while others encountered serious date problems. Roan had to evaluate the entire record.

The Court Officers Answer the Outside-Contact Claims

Frank’s lawyers also alleged that the jury had been exposed to improper cheering, outside communication, and intimidation. The State answered with affidavits from officers and people who observed the jury’s movements, including Charles F. Huber, A. F. Pennington, R. B. Deavors, W. M. Hunter, Z. A. Mann, Plennie Miner, Drew Liddell, and J. C. Lewis (New-Trial Record, 3).

The affidavits addressed supervision, dining arrangements, custody, courtroom separation, and alleged attempts to communicate with jurors. Miner provided an alternative explanation for one incident involving W. P. Neill, while other officers described where they were stationed and whether they observed improper communication.

This evidence concerned alleged outside influence during trial and should remain separate from the claim that Henslee or Johenning possessed a fixed personal opinion before serving. A juror could enter court impartial and later face intimidation, or possess an earlier opinion without being influenced by a crowd. Each theory required evidence about its own events.

October 23: The Juror Dispute Becomes Central to the Hearing

On Thursday, October 23, The Atlanta Georgian described the fight over Henslee and Johenning as one of the bitterest parts of Frank’s new-trial hearing. The paper reported investigators were still searching for additional people who had heard the two jurors speak before trial and identified C. W. Burke as working for Rosser along Henslee’s business route (The Atlanta Georgian, 45).

The report demonstrates that the affidavit collection remained active while the hearing was underway. By that point, the accusations had received weeks of publicity, and potential witnesses could have known the kinds of statements the defense was seeking. Those circumstances justified caution about later recollections, although they do not establish that a particular witness altered his memory because of newspaper coverage.

October 23–24: Roan Recognizes the Seriousness of Proven Bias

Judge Roan understood that a genuinely disqualified juror could threaten the verdict. During the Thursday, October 23 hearing, he discussed the allegations against Henslee and Johenning, and The Atlanta Constitution reported the following day that proof of the accusations could make further argument nearly unnecessary (The Atlanta Constitution, 46).

This is one of the strongest contemporary facts supporting the seriousness of Roan’s approach. He recognized the possible consequences of proof, and the dispute was whether the defense had sufficiently established the accusations. His eventual denial should therefore be read in light of the evidentiary conflict rather than portrayed as a refusal to consider the issue.

October 24: Roan Personally Examines the Affidavits

The Atlanta Georgian of Friday, October 24 reported that the Henslee and Johenning grounds were held while Roan personally examined the defense affidavits and the State’s counter-affidavits. The Atlanta Journal also reported the formal reading of the juror affidavits, including those concerning Stough, the Sparta witnesses, Nunnally, Ricker, Gremer, the Farkas witnesses, Aron, Harrison, and the Loevenharts (The Atlanta Georgian, 47) (The Atlanta Journal, 48).

The material had moved from investigation and newspaper controversy into the formal judicial proceeding. Roan had the accusations and answers before him, along with the documentary evidence and the lawyers’ arguments. The record therefore does not support a claim that the juror evidence went entirely unexamined.

October 25: Arnold Broadens the Attack to Religious Prejudice

Reuben Arnold used the Henslee allegations to develop a broader argument about anti-Jewish prejudice. The Atlanta Georgian of Saturday, October 25 reported Arnold comparing Atlanta’s atmosphere with the contemporary Mendel Beilis prosecution in Kiev and arguing that prejudice and public hostility had influenced Frank’s treatment (The Atlanta Georgian, 49).

The comparison was a lawyer’s argument and did not independently establish the truth of the disputed conversations in Albany, Sparta, Monroe, or Atlanta. The individual accusations still required proof, especially those involving exact language attributed to Henslee.

The historical importance is clear. The religious-prejudice issue was explicitly argued in October 1913, and the prosecution answered it directly. Neither side’s general argument removed the need to examine the specific evidence concerning the two jurors.

October 27: Arnold Calls Henslee a Cold Plotter

The Atlanta Georgian of Monday, October 27 carried the headline “Henslee Is Attacked as Cold Plotter.” Arnold portrayed Henslee as a man who had concealed a fixed opinion and entered the jury determined to convict Frank (The Atlanta Georgian, 51).

This was the defense theory at its strongest. It required more than proof that Henslee had spoken recklessly during an informal conversation, because it suggested deliberate concealment and a purposeful scheme. The theory also needed to address the doubtful ballot and the fellow-juror affidavits describing conscientious behavior.

The court could examine the underlying evidence without accepting every additional inference in a lawyer’s speech. A forceful argument did not eliminate the contradictions within the affidavits or the need to decide whether the most damaging words had actually been spoken.

October 28: Dorsey Attacks the Defense Investigation

Solicitor General Hugh Manson Dorsey made his most detailed answer during the October 28 hearing. The Atlanta Journal reported him emphasizing the extensive investigative resources available to Rosser and Arnold and arguing that the defense had searched Georgia with a “fine tooth comb” for anything capable of attacking a juror (The Atlanta Journal, 52).

This was advocacy, but it was consistent with contemporary descriptions of investigators tracing Henslee’s business route. Dorsey’s point was that the quantity of affidavits could not substitute for examining their individual reliability.

Dorsey Asked Where the Other Listeners Were

Dorsey questioned allegations of conversations supposedly heard by several people when not all those people had offered sworn statements. Missing corroborators do not prove the original witness lied, but their absence limits the independent confirmation available to the court.

He also attacked uncertain dates, the Sparta summons problem, and the difference between remembered words and witnesses’ interpretations. His argument was that the defense had gathered statements showing possible opinions without necessarily establishing the fixed prejudice required for disqualification.

Dorsey Distinguished Anger Toward Mary’s Murderer From Prejudice Against Frank

Henslee admitted expressing anger toward whoever murdered Mary Phagan. Dorsey argued that condemning the unknown murderer was different from announcing that Frank was guilty. A citizen could believe the murderer deserved hanging while remaining uncertain about which suspect committed the crime.

The defense therefore needed evidence showing that Henslee had firmly identified Frank as the murderer and closed his mind to contrary evidence. Aron, Stough, Nunnally, Ricker, Harrison, and the other accusers claimed he had done exactly that, while the State challenged their accounts and the conclusions drawn from them.

Dorsey’s Newspaper-Opinion Argument

Dorsey also argued that an opinion based on newspapers or rumor did not automatically amount to legal disqualification. He noted that Henslee had not been shown to know Frank or Mary personally and had not heard sworn trial evidence when the alleged pretrial conversations occurred.

This argument was especially relevant to Johenning. Johenning admitted discussing how the case looked in newspapers, while the Loevenharts said he went much further. Roan had to decide which version established the real character of the conversation.

Dorsey’s “Gentile Race” and “Jewish Race” Rebuttal

Under the newspaper heading “Denies Racial Feeling,” Dorsey began by speaking “in the name of the Gentile race and of all self-respecting members of the Jewish race.” He then denied that hostility toward Frank arose because he was Jewish and argued that public sentiment grew from belief in Frank’s guilt (The Atlanta Journal, 52).

The passage belongs beside Arnold’s argument because the two lawyers presented competing interpretations of the same public atmosphere. Arnold accused the community of anti-Jewish prejudice, while Dorsey rejected the accusation. Neither lawyer’s statement establishes the complete historical truth.

Dorsey’s denial does not prove anti-Jewish hostility was absent from Atlanta, just as Arnold’s broad argument does not independently prove the two challenged jurors were disqualified. The specific affidavits, denials, and corroborating evidence remained central to the legal issue.

October 29: Dorsey Defends Both Jurors

On Wednesday, October 29, The Atlanta Georgian reported Dorsey devoting extensive attention to Henslee and Johenning. He defended their integrity and gave especially strong praise to Johenning’s conscientious character (The Atlanta Georgian, 53).

This part of the record is often overshadowed by the dramatic accusations against Henslee. Dorsey did not leave Johenning to defend himself alone. He presented both men as citizens who had performed their duty and whose qualifications had been unfairly attacked, a position the State maintained throughout the hearing.

October 30: Eleven Accusers and Three Impeachment Attacks

The Atlanta Georgian of Thursday, October 30 gave an important numerical summary. It reported eleven direct Henslee accusers and said Dorsey had sought to impeach three of them. Rosser and Arnold argued that Dorsey would have attacked the remaining eight if he had been able to find witnesses willing to do so (The Atlanta Georgian, 55).

This was a significant defense argument because it emphasized the number of accusers whose reputations the State had not directly challenged. The answer is that reputation and recollection were different questions. A witness of excellent reputation could still confuse a date, misidentify a speaker, or remember a conversation more strongly than it occurred.

The eleven accusations deserved attention, but they did not remove the chronology problems, overlapping conversations, uncertain identifications, or affirmative counter-evidence. The court had to consider all of those features when assessing the weight of the affidavits.

October 31: Judge Roan Denies Another Trial

Judge Roan denied Frank’s motion for a new trial on Friday, October 31, 1913. The order was brief and did not provide separate credibility findings concerning every witness. Roan did not issue a detailed account explaining whether he personally believed Aron, Stough, Holmes, Gremer, Ricker, the Loevenharts, or each of the other accusers (Motion for New Trial, 2) (The Atlanta Journal, 56).

A careful study cannot invent findings he never wrote. The record establishes that he received the competing evidence, recognized the potential importance of proven juror prejudice, heard the lawyers, and denied the motion. His formal ruling is the legal result, while the exact weight he assigned to individual witnesses remains partly unknown.

Roan’s Personal Doubt About Frank’s Guilt

Roan also expressed personal uncertainty concerning Frank’s guilt. That statement is part of the historical record, but it concerned the overall murder case rather than proving a specific juror had been disqualified.

A judge could remain uncertain about the defendant’s guilt while deciding that a particular procedural objection had not been established. The Georgia Supreme Court later treated Roan’s formal denial as the controlling judicial action, and his personal uncertainty did not establish the accusations against Henslee or Johenning (Frank v. State, 1).

November 1: The Legal Rule Concerning Conflicting Juror Evidence

On Saturday, November 1, The Atlanta Constitution reported another Georgia appellate decision concerning post-verdict attacks on jurors. The newspaper emphasized the trial judge’s responsibility for deciding conflicting testimony about juror qualifications (The Atlanta Constitution, 57).

The headline suggested the trial judge had the final word, which was somewhat compressed because appellate review remained available. The underlying legal principle was genuine: the trial judge was responsible for resolving the factual dispute, and the appellate court reviewed whether he had abused his discretion. This rule was not invented for Frank’s case.

February 17, 1914: The Georgia Supreme Court Reviews Henslee

The Georgia Supreme Court directly examined the Henslee allegation in Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243. Ground 73 asserted that Henslee had been prejudiced before selection and had expressed a decided opinion concerning Frank’s guilt. The Court acknowledged that Frank had introduced evidence tending to show Henslee made statements indicating strong prejudice, while also recognizing Henslee’s sworn denial (Frank v. State, 1).

The Court then applied the established rule assigning resolution of the factual dispute to the trial judge and found no abuse of discretion. This was the legal result of the extensive Henslee affidavit campaign. The Supreme Court did not say no evidence existed against him, and it did not declare all defense witnesses dishonest. It recognized the conflict and sustained Roan’s authority to resolve it.

The Supreme Court Reviews Johenning Separately

The opinion then addressed Johenning and again recognized that the evidence was conflicting. The Court upheld Roan’s determination that Johenning had not been shown prejudiced or biased (Frank v. State, 1).

This was a specific judicial ruling on the second juror. The Court did not overlook Johenning or leave the accusation unanswered. It reviewed the issue and sustained the trial judge’s resolution of the competing evidence.

The Four-to-Two Decision Was About More Than the Jurors

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Frank’s conviction by a vote of four to two. Chief Justice William H. Fish and Justice Marcus W. Beck dissented concerning a separate evidentiary issue involving testimony about alleged prior sexual conduct. Their published dissent did not establish that Henslee or Johenning was prejudiced (Frank v. State, 1).

The division should therefore not be portrayed as a four-to-two judicial disagreement over the two accused jurors. The published dissent addressed another aspect of the case, while the majority upheld Roan’s treatment of the juror allegations.

The Court Also Found the Murder Evidence Legally Sufficient

The Georgia Supreme Court separately reviewed the contention that the guilty verdict lacked evidentiary support and held that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdict. That ruling should remain separate from the juror question because legally sufficient evidence cannot cure a genuinely disqualified juror, while a juror-bias accusation does not automatically make the murder evidence insufficient.

The Court treated both questions under their respective legal standards. Its sufficiency ruling did not establish what Henslee privately thought before the trial, but it did independently sustain the evidentiary basis for the verdict.

C. W. Burke and the Later Investigative Controversies

C. W. Burke connects the 1913 juror investigation with later disputes concerning defense investigative methods. In October 1913, newspapers identified him as an agent for Rosser, and he notarized the Loevenhart affidavits. His signature establishes participation in their formal execution, not independent verification of the May conversations.

Other officers administered oaths on the principal Henslee affidavits. Burke should therefore not be described as the notary responsible for every accusation. The significance of his role concerns how the Johenning papers entered the record and whether his later investigative history provides grounds for closer scrutiny.

Burke and Ira Fisher

Burke became involved in the Ira W. Fisher episode, which produced a sensational accusation concerning another man in the Phagan case. Frank’s attorneys subsequently distanced themselves from Fisher’s story (The Atlanta Journal, 58).

The episode demonstrated that an investigative lead could produce dramatic claims without enduring evidentiary support. It does not prove Burke invented the account or establish that he had mishandled the earlier juror affidavits.

Burke, George Epps, and “Kelly”

George Epps later signed a statement changing portions of his earlier story and subsequently repudiated it. Disputes arose concerning investigators using assumed names, and N. A. Garner later identified a man described as “Kelly” as C. W. Burke.

The allegations and responses were contested. The episode occurred after Roan ruled in October 1913, so it cannot explain his original decision. It can inform a modern investigation of defense witness-handling methods, provided the claims are tested against their own original documents.

Burke and Albert McKnight

Albert McKnight later signed an affidavit favorable to Frank and subsequently repudiated it. He accused Burke of discussing possible employment and housing arrangements, while Burke denied any agreement to purchase testimony (The Atlanta Journal, 58).

The surviving material establishes a controversy involving proposed assistance and witness handling. It does not conclusively prove a completed exchange of false testimony for employment, and calling it a proven bribe would go further than the documents permit.

June 18, 1914: Burke Is Indicted

On Thursday, June 18, 1914, The Atlanta Journal reported a Fulton County grand-jury indictment accusing Burke of attempted subornation of perjury in connection with a Ferguson witness (The Atlanta Journal, 59).

An indictment is a formal accusation rather than a conviction, and the materials examined here do not establish the final disposition of that charge. The timing is also essential because the indictment occurred more than seven months after Roan denied Frank’s first new-trial motion. Roan could not have relied upon it when deciding the Henslee and Johenning claims.

Burke’s later controversies justify close examination of his investigative methods. They do not prove that the 1913 Loevenhart affidavits were fabricated, purchased, or dictated.

What the Defense Investigation Actually Proved

The defense succeeded in finding multiple people willing to swear that Henslee had expressed strong prejudgment. It located witnesses across several Georgia communities, uncovered an important contradiction in his Albany travel account, and produced allegations involving violent and anti-Jewish language. It also obtained family testimony accusing Johenning of expressing a settled opinion of Frank’s guilt.

These were genuine pieces of evidence, and the investigation was serious and potentially consequential. The important weaknesses appeared when the evidence was examined closely. Several witnesses described overlapping incidents, some dates became uncertain, and one documentary challenge helped Henslee while another went against him.

The Blakely accusation failed, the Sparta testimony contained the jury-summons problem, and Virgil Harris publicly denied giving an affidavit. Some affiants were reluctant or required legal process, others faced credibility attacks, and fellow jurors described conscientious behavior while supporting the doubtful-ballot account. The Loevenhart evidence remained a concentrated family-versus-juror credibility dispute.

These problems did not eliminate the defense case. They explain why the court could regard it as conflicting and why the affidavit count could not decide the issue by itself.

What the Affidavit Count Cannot Tell Us

Eleven direct Henslee accusers did not represent eleven fully independent prejudicial conversations. Three witnesses described Sparta, two described Monroe, two described Albany, and the remaining witnesses described separate encounters. Multiple witnesses to one incident can strengthen corroboration without turning one conversation into several independent events.

The wider collection also included affidavits concerning reputation, hotel registrations, commercial transactions, and jury behavior. Those documents addressed different questions. A hotel register establishes presence, an order form establishes business, a character affidavit concerns reputation, and a juror’s statement concerns his own conduct.

Each document must be assessed according to what it can actually establish. Counting every paper together can make the showing appear more independent than its contents justify.

Why Judge Roan Could Reject the Claims Without Calling Every Accuser Dishonest

Roan did not need to conclude that every defense witness lied. He could believe a witness remembered a genuine conversation but confused the date, or accept the Albany records while remaining uncertain about the exact words attributed to Henslee. He could regard Lehman’s later qualification of June 2 as weakening the original accusation, or find Henslee’s post-verdict explanation for Sparta plausible despite the witnesses’ insistence.

He could also regard the Loevenharts and Johenning as sincere people who remembered or interpreted the same exchange differently. The fellow jurors’ observations, the doubtful ballot, character evidence on both sides, and the aggressive manner in which affidavits were collected could all affect the weight he assigned to the record.

These are reasonable ways a judge might evaluate the evidence, although they are not separate written findings Roan left concerning each witness. The central fact remains that he considered the conflicting record and denied another trial.

Why the Georgia Supreme Court Upheld Roan

The Georgia Supreme Court had a different responsibility from the trial judge. Roan was the initial finder of fact on the disputed juror qualifications, while the Supreme Court reviewed his decision under Georgia law. It acknowledged the accusations and denials, recognized the conflict, and concluded that Roan had not abused his discretion.

Regarding Johenning, the Court expressly upheld Roan’s determination that the juror was not prejudiced or biased (Frank v. State, 1).

That is a substantial legal result. It does not prove every defense affiant was mistaken, but it establishes that the evidence did not require the appellate court to overturn Roan’s resolution of the factual dispute. The defense had to demonstrate more than the existence of one plausible interpretation favoring Frank.

The Strongest Evidence Against Henslee

The strongest case against Henslee consisted of multiple accusations from different communities, including two witnesses attributing explicitly anti-Jewish language. The Monroe encounter was substantially admitted, although its contents were disputed, and the Sparta witnesses described a shared conversation while continuing to stand by their account. Aron alleged exceptionally serious language, and the defense produced character evidence supporting many of its witnesses.

The July 8 Albany records independently contradicted part of Henslee’s sworn travel chronology, creating an important weakness in his credibility. That documentary contradiction remains genuine and should not be explained away simply because Roan denied the motion. The accusations cannot fairly be dismissed as one unsupported rumor.

The Strongest Evidence Supporting Henslee

The State possessed substantial contrary evidence. The Blakely accusation failed, the June 2 New Albany Hotel evidence challenged Lehman’s original chronology, and the Sparta summons detail conflicted with Henslee’s July 25 notice. Virgil Harris denied being an accuser, several defense witnesses faced reputation attacks, and Henslee admitted some conversations while offering explanations concerning their dates and contents.

Numerous fellow jurors reported no observed prejudice, and several supported his doubtful ballot. A doubtful vote had been reported immediately after the verdict, long before the October accusations were fully developed. Together, those points support the conclusion that Roan faced genuinely conflicting evidence rather than a collection of unanswered accusations.

The Strongest Evidence Against Johenning

The three Loevenharts accused Johenning of pretrial prejudgment, with Miriam attributing a direct declaration of guilt. Johenning admitted speaking with Jennie and Miriam, and the workplace connection with H. C. Loevenhart received support from city directories.

If the family accurately remembered a fixed declaration of guilt, its evidence raised a serious issue concerning qualification. The question was whether their interpretation of the conversations established that conclusion in the face of Johenning’s different account.

The Strongest Evidence Supporting Johenning

The principal accusers were members of one family, with Jennie and Miriam describing the same general encounter. Johenning denied H. C.’s separate conversation, acknowledged speaking with the women, and gave a detailed alternative account tied to newspaper coverage. His version reserved judgment for the trial, and no comparable direct anti-Jewish accusation was made against him.

His fellow jurors described conscientious conduct, character witnesses supported his reputation, and contemporary reporting showed him seeking clarification of evidence. Tarleton Collier’s pre-verdict account also portrayed him as apparently uncertain, although that was a reporter’s subjective impression. Roan resolved the conflict in Johenning’s favor, and the Georgia Supreme Court upheld that decision.

Final Conclusion

The accusations against Atticus Haygood Henslee and Marcellus Johenning were serious, documented, and disputed. Frank’s attorneys carried out an extensive investigation after the verdict, following Henslee’s business travels, interviewing merchants and acquaintances, gathering affidavits, pursuing reluctant witnesses, and using legal process to compel testimony. The investigation produced evidence capable of supporting a challenge to the verdict, but it also produced contradictions, uncertain dates, failed leads, and questions concerning how individual statements were obtained.

The Blakely lead failed, Lehman’s original June 2 date weakened under documentary examination, and the Sparta account contained a serious summons problem. Virgil Harris publicly corrected an inaccurate association with the Monroe allegations, while some witnesses faced impeachment evidence and several affidavits described shared conversations rather than independent events. The most damaging documentary evidence against Henslee was the July 8 Albany order and hotel registration, which exposed an error in his travel account without independently establishing the prejudicial words attributed to him.

The doubtful ballot, reported immediately after the verdict and later supported by fellow jurors, provided meaningful evidence against the simplest theory that Henslee entered deliberations determined to force an immediate conviction. Johenning faced a narrower attack from three members of the Loevenhart family. He admitted the principal encounter with Jennie and Miriam while disputing their description of his remarks, and the State answered with favorable character evidence and observations of his conduct during trial.

Dorsey’s October 28 rebuttal belongs in the historical record alongside Arnold’s accusations. He challenged the investigative search, the uncertain dates, missing corroborators, newspaper-based opinions, and the broader argument concerning religious prejudice. His arguments did not establish that every defense witness was mistaken, but they gave Roan substantial reasons to examine the affidavits cautiously.

Judge Roan recognized the possible legal consequences of proven juror bias. He examined the competing evidence and denied Frank another trial on Friday, October 31, 1913. The Georgia Supreme Court then reviewed the two jurors separately on Tuesday, February 17, 1914, recognizing conflicting evidence concerning Henslee and finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding Johenning, it expressly upheld Roan’s determination that the juror was not prejudiced or biased.

The courts did not erase the affidavits or declare every witness dishonest. They resolved a contested evidentiary record under Georgia law. The strongest historical argument supporting Judge Roan and the Georgia Supreme Court rests upon the documented weaknesses of the post-verdict accusations, the substantial evidence answering them, and the trial judge’s responsibility to resolve conflicting testimony.

Frank’s attorneys found allegations serious enough to investigate and argue, but their affidavit campaign did not establish a record so clear and compelling that Judge Roan was legally required to overturn the verdict. Georgia’s highest court upheld his decision.

References

1. Supreme Court of Georgia. (1914, Tuesday, February 17). Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S.E. 1016. Ground 73 and the separate Johenning challenge.https://openjurist.org/141/ga/243/frank-v-state
2. Superior Court of Fulton County. (1913). State of Georgia v. Leo M. Frank: Motion for new trial, exhibits, depositions, certification, and order.
   Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict (6) PDF

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3. Superior Court of Fulton County. (1913, October). New-trial record and State counter-affidavits. Henslee and Johenning responses, fellow-juror testimony, character evidence, and related records.
   Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict (5) PDF

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4. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Tuesday, July 29). “Trial of Leo M. Frank on Charge of Murder Begins.” Jury information.
   Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict (4) PDF

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5. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Monday, July 28). “Personnel of Frank Jury All Married Except One.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-journal/1913-07-28-personnel-of-frank-jury-all-married-except-one/
6. Lamar County, Georgia, GaGenWeb. (n.d.). Marriage and burial records. Atticus Haygood Henslee and Elizabeth May Franklin Henslee.https://thegagenweb.com/galamar/marriages.html

   https://thegagenweb.com/galamar/burials.html

7. Atlanta City Directory Company. (1912, 1914, 1916, 1919). Atlanta city directories. Henslee and Johenning entries.https://www.ldsgenealogy.com/GA/books/Atlanta-City-Directory-Cos-Greater-Atlanta-Georgia-city-directory-including-Avondale-Buckhead-and-all-immediate-suburbs-1912-part-142.htm

   https://www.ldsgenealogy.com/GA/books/Atlanta-City-Directory-1919-part-89.htm

8. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Friday, August 1). “Lawyers Battle Over Testimony of Frank’s Nervousness.” Johenning’s time-clock question.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-08-01-lawyers-battle-over-testimony-of-franks-nervousness-witness-swears-negro-was-in-factory-about-1-oclock-the-atlanta-journal/
9. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Tuesday, August 19). “Wife at Last Breaks Down, Overcome by Frank’s Story.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-08-19-wife-at-last-breaks-down-overcome-by-franks-story-the-atlanta-georgian/
10. Collier, T. (1913, Sunday, August 24). “Frank Jurors an Enthralling Study in Human Emotion.” Hearst’s Sunday American, p. 4A.
    Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict (3) PDF

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11. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Sunday, August 10). “Playing Practical Jokes on Watchful Bailiffs Is Pastime of Frank Jurors.”https://www.leofrank.tv/1913-08-10-playing-practical-jokes-on-watchful-bailiffs-is-pastime-of-frank-jurors-the-atlanta-journal/
12. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Tuesday, August 26). “Only One Ballot Taken by Jury and Fate of Frank Was Decided.” p. 7.
    Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict (2) PDF

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13. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Tuesday, August 26). “Frank Guilty on First Ballot.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-08-26-frank-guilty-on-first-ballot-the-atlanta-georgian/
14. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Tuesday, August 26). “Twelve Peers of Leo M. Frank Who Found Guilty of Murder.” Initial divided-ballot report.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-08-26-twelve-peers-of-leo-m-frank-who-found-guilty-of-murder-the-atlanta-journal/
15. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Friday, September 26). “Did Not Discuss Guilt of Frank.” p. 5, col. 1. Black and Thomas depositions.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-09-26-did-not-discuss-guilt-of-frank-the-atlanta-constitution/
16. Loevenhart, H. C., & Loevenhart, M. (1913, Tuesday, September 2). Affidavits concerning Marcellus Johenning. Exhibits G and H.https://www.maryphagan.com/0947-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
17. Loevenhart, J. G. (1913, Friday, September 26). Affidavit concerning Marcellus Johenning. Exhibit F, printed record page 126.https://www.maryphagan.com/0946-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
18. Gremer, R. L., & Farkas, M. (1913, Thursday, September 4). Albany affidavits concerning A. H. Henslee.https://www.maryphagan.com/0943-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/

    https://www.maryphagan.com/0944-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/

19. Lehman, J. A. (1913, Friday, September 12). Affidavit concerning two alleged Henslee conversations. Exhibit C.https://www.maryphagan.com/0944-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
20. Holmes, J. M., Gray, S., & Johnson, T. M. (1913, Friday, September 26). Sparta depositions concerning Henslee. Exhibit MM. The contemporary press identifies Johnson as S. M.https://www.maryphagan.com/0969-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/

    https://www.maryphagan.com/0970-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/

    https://www.maryphagan.com/0972-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/

21. Nunnally, J. J., & Ricker, W. L. (1913, Saturday, September 27). Monroe depositions concerning Henslee.https://www.maryphagan.com/0974-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
22. Stough, C. P. (1913, Monday, September 29). Streetcar conversation deposition.https://www.maryphagan.com/0968-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
23. Aron, S. (1913, Friday, October 3). Affidavit concerning an alleged Elks Club conversation.https://www.maryphagan.com/0945-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
24. Henslee, A. H. (1913, October). Sworn answer to the juror-bias accusations.https://www.maryphagan.com/0052-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
25. Johenning, M. (1913, October). Counter-affidavit concerning the Loevenhart accusations.https://www.maryphagan.com/0046-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
26. Franklin Buggy Company. (1913, Tuesday, July 8). Order to Sam Farkas, Albany, Georgia. Exhibit BB.https://www.maryphagan.com/0961-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
27. Little, W. W. (1913, Thursday, October 23). Affidavit concerning Henslee’s July 8 New Albany Hotel registration.https://www.maryphagan.com/0303-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
28. Lehman, J. A. (1913, Monday, October 13). Supplemental affidavit. Exhibit DD, printed record page 142. Also contains the October 10 Nunnally and Ricker statement.https://www.maryphagan.com/0962-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
29. Harrison, L. (1913, Wednesday, October 8). Affidavit concerning an alleged Peachtree Street conversation.https://www.maryphagan.com/0296-slide-georgia-supreme-court-leo-frank-appeals-documents-1913-1914/
30. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Wednesday, October 1). “Frank Motion Is Served on Solicitor.” p. 1. Reports the 115-ground motion and accusations against two jurors.https://www.leofrank.tv/1913-10-01-frank-motion-is-served-on-solicitor-the-atlanta-journal/
31. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Thursday, October 2). “Ask New Frank Trial on 115 Counts.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-georgian/1913-10-02-ask-new-frank-trial-on-115-counts-many-errors-laid-to-court-charge-made-of-jury-intimidation/
32. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Friday, October 3). “Frank Trial Juror Denies Charge of Bias.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-georgian/1913-10-03-frank-trial-juror-denies-charge-of-bias/
33. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Saturday, October 4). “Affidavits Attacking Frank Jurors Made Public.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-journal/1913-10-04-affidavits-attacking-frank-jurors-made-public-two-jurors-prejudiced-say-affidavits-and-jury-heard-crowds-cheer-and-threaten/
34. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Monday, October 6). “Sparta Citizens Insist Henslee Was Prejudiced.” p. 1, col. 2.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-06-sparta-citizens-insist-henslee-was-prejudiced-the-atlanta-constitution/
35. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Tuesday, October 7). “Made His Remarks About Leo Frank After Trial and Not Before, Says Juror Accused of Prejudice.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-07-henslee-answers-sprata-citizens-the-atlanta-constitution/
36. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Tuesday, October 7). “Dorsey at Work to Combat Charge.” Includes Henslee’s confrontation with Lehman.https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-georgian/1913-10-07-dorsey-at-work-to-combat-charge/
37. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Wednesday, October 8). “Frank Hearing to Be Postponed Another Week.” Includes Virgil Harris’s correction.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-08-frank-hearing-to-be-postponed-another-week-the-atlanta-journal/
38. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Wednesday, October 8). “Both Sides Confident in Frank Case.” Stiles Hopkins and the defense affiants.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-08-both-sides-confident-in-frank-case-the-atlanta-georgian/
39. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Monday, October 13). “Attack Is Renewed on Frank Juror.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-13-attack-is-renewed-on-frank-juror-the-atlanta-georgian/
40. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Tuesday, October 14). “Dorsey Gathers Proof Against Bias Charges.”https://gahistoricnewspapers.galileo.usg.edu/lccn/sn89053729/1913-10-14/ed-1/seq-2/
41. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Friday, October 17). “Sparta Citizens Attack Frank Trial Juror.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-17-sparta-citizens-attack-frank-trial-juror-the-atlanta-georgian/
42. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Monday, October 20). “Way Clear for Frank Battle.” Harrison and related allegations.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-20-way-clear-for-frank-battle-the-atlanta-georgian/
43. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Tuesday, October 21). “Thirty Affidavits Against New Frank Trial.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-21-fisher-under-third-degree-shirley-s-accuser-in-cell-the-atlanta-georgian/
44. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Wednesday, October 22). “Many Affidavits Defend the Jury.” p. 1, col. 4.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-22-many-affidavits-defend-the-jury-the-atlanta-constitution/
45. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Thursday, October 23). “Judge’s Admissions Help Frank’s Chance.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-23-judge-s-admissions-help-frank-s-chance-the-atlanta-georgian/
46. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Friday, October 24). “Proof of Charges Will Mean a New Trial, Says Court.” p. 1, col. 2.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-24-proof-of-charges-will-mean-a-new-trial-says-court-the-atlanta-constitution/
47. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Friday, October 24). “Disputes Block Frank Speech.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-24-disputes-block-frank-speech-the-atlanta-georgian/
48. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Friday, October 24). “Frank Motion Is Almost Ready for the Arguments Now.” p. 1, col. 2.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-24-frank-motion-is-almost-ready-for-the-arguments-now-the-atlanta-journal/
49. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Saturday, October 25). “Atlanta’s Prejudice as Bitter as Russia’s, Declares Attorney.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-25-atlanta-s-prejudice-as-bitter-as-russia-s-declares-attorney-the-atlanta-georgian/
50. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Saturday, October 25). New-trial hearing coverage concerning Henslee’s doubtful ballot and State affidavits.
    Two Jurors Accused of Bias After the Leo Frank Verdict PDF

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51. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Monday, October 27). “Henslee Is Attacked as Cold Plotter.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-27-henslee-is-attacked-as-cold-plotter-the-atlanta-georgian/
52. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Tuesday, October 28). “Solicitor Dorsey Hammers Frank New Trial Motion.” p. 1, col. 1, continued on p. 2, col. 3.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-28-solicitor-dorsey-hammers-frank-new-trial-motion-the-atlanta-journal/
53. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Wednesday, October 29). “Negro’s Statement Legal Evidence, He Says; State Closes.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-29-negro-s-statement-legal-evidence-he-says-state-closes-the-atlanta-georgian/
54. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Wednesday, October 29). “Frank New Trial Hearing to End This Afternoon.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-journal/1913-10-29-frank-new-trial-hearing-to-end-this-afternoon/
55. The Atlanta Georgian. (1913, Thursday, October 30). “Frank Alibi Upheld by Rosser in Closing.” Reports eleven Henslee affiants and the State’s impeachment efforts.https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-10-30-frank-alibi-upheld-by-rosser-in-closing-the-atlanta-georgian/
56. The Atlanta Journal. (1913, Friday, October 31). “Leo Frank’s Lawyers Prepare for Supreme Court Fight.”https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-journal/1913-10-31-leo-franks-lawyers-prepare-for-supreme-court-fight/
57. The Atlanta Constitution. (1913, Saturday, November 1). “Trial Judge Says Last Word on Bias of Jury, Declares Court of Appeals.”https://www.maryphagan.com/1913-11-01-trial-judge-says-last-word-on-bias-of-jury-declares-court-of-appeals-the-atlanta-constitution/
58. The Atlanta Journal. (1914, Tuesday, May 5). “Many Sensations Sprung by Dorsey at Frank Hearing.” Later investigative controversies.https://www.maryphagan.com/1914-05-05-many-sensations-sprung-by-dorsey-at-frank-hearing-the-atlanta-journal/
59. The Atlanta Journal. (1914, Thursday, June 18). “C. W. Burke Indicted for Suborning Perjury.” p. 1, col. 5.https://www.leofrank.com/atlanta-journal/1914-06-18-c-w-burke-indicted-for-suborning-perjury/
60. The Atlanta Georgian. (1916, Sunday, June 4). “Henslee to Run for Prison Commission.”https://gahistoricnewspapers.galileo.usg.edu/lccn/sn89053729/1916-06-04/ed-1/seq-118/
61. The Jeffersonian. (1916, Thursday, July 6). Campaign publicity concerning A. H. Henslee.https://www.loc.gov/resource/sn82014546/1916-07-06/ed-1/?sp=4